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NOTES
THE BIFURCATED BASIS CONCEPT: AN ALGORITHM
FOR THE SYNTHESIS OF THE MERCHANT
MARINE ACT AND THE INVESTMENT
TAX CREDIT
I. INTRODUCTION
The investment tax credit (ITC) is designed to spur new investment'
in qualified2 assets by directly reducing the taxpayer's income tax lia-
bility. The investment credit may be characterized, in the argot of
academia, as a tax expenditure.' The Internal Revenue Code (Code)
contains a number of such provisions,4 but the Merchant Marine Act of
1. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3304, 3314.
2. Id at 14, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3316. Qualified investment is
defined by the Internal Revenue Code as:
A) the applicable percentage of the basis of each new section 38 property (as defined in
section 48(b)) placed in service by the taxpayer during such taxable year, plus
B) the applicable percentage of the cost of each used section 38 property (as defined in
section 48(c)(1)) placed in service during such taxable year.
I.R.C. § 46(c)(1) (1976). The applicable percentage, according to I.R.C. § 46(c)(2), depends upon
the useful life of the asset. Because I.R.C. § 38 is titled "Investment in Certain Depreciable Prop-
erty," it should be apparent that the investment tax credit is granted on basis which is generally
equal to the applicable percentage times the cost basis in depreciable property.
3. A tax expenditure may be described as follows:
[Wlhenever government decides to favor an activity or group through monetary assist-
ance, it may elect from a wide range of methods [such as a] government grant or subsidy,
a government loan, perhaps at a special interest rate, or a private loan guaranteed by the
government. Instead of direct assistance the government may work within the income
tax system to reduce the tax otherwise owed by a favored activity or group. Examples of
this indirect government assistance are investment credits [and] special depreciation de-
ductions .... These tax reductions, in effect monetary assistance provided by the gov-
ernment, represent tax expenditures.
Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues,
20 B.C. L. REv. 225, 228 (1979). See generaly S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE
CONCEPT OF TAx EXPENDITURES (1973); Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation--Tax Expenditure or
Proper Allowancefor Measuring Net Income4 78 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1979); Surrey, Tax Incentives as
a Devicefor Implementing Government Policy. A Comparison with Direct Government Expendi-
tures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the
Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B. C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 679 (1976).
4. Several of the major tax expenditure provisions include deductions for state and local
nonbusiness taxes, I.R.C. § 164 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), deductions for charitable contributions,
I.R.C. § 170 (1976 & West Supp. 1982), deductions for interest expense, I.R.C. § 163 (1976), and
credit for the elderly, I.R.C. § 37 (West Supp. 1982). See generally W. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL
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1970 (MMA)5 is tax expenditure legislation that Congress enacted
outside the confines of the Code. The MMA grants tax deferred status
to funds set aside for new ship construction. It provides for a current
deduction for cash set aside and a concomitant reduction in the basis of
vessels acquired with such funds.6 Congress designed this basis reduc-
tion to prevent the taxpayer from taking deductions at both the time of
deposit of the funds and again while depreciating the newly acquired
asset.7
This Note demonstrates that, although Congress did not clearly con-
template interaction between the MMA and the investment tax credit
when the ITC was enacted,8 the policy behind the tax credit and the
nature of the MMA benefits support a statutory interpretation granting
full ITC benefits to MMA beneficiaries.9 The reduction in depreciable
basis that occurs when deductible deposits are made to a capital con-
struction fund'0 should not affect the calculation of the investment
credit amount.1 This Note examines the legislative intent manifested
in the ITC, and analyzes the concept of basis in light of that intent. It
compares the differing functions of basis for depreciation as opposed to
investment tax credit purposes. 12 Finally, this Note concludes that be-
cause the MMA creates nothing more than a depreciation form analo-
gous to accelerated depreciation, 3 all vessel operators 4 should receive
full ITC benefits. 5
INCOME TAXATION 317-22 (2d ed. 1979); B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
26-33 (5th ed. 1980).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-469, 84 Stat. 1018 (codified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.).
6. Merchant Marine Act of 1970, 46 U.S.C. § 1177(d), (g) (1976).
7. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 41-64 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 20.
11. The amount of the investment tax credit available to a taxpayer is calculated by taking
the appropriate basis in the depreciable asset and multiplying it by the product of the regular
percentage times the applicable percentage. See I.R.C. § 38 (1976); I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV
1980); I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980); I.R.C. § 46(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
12. See infra notes 88-97 & 118-24 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 135.
14. Fleet owners using cash from a capital construction fund to acquire an eligible vessel are
granted only 50% of the applicable percentage as the rate to be used in calculating the credit. That
is, if 10% was the regular percentage, the taxpayer would get only a 5% tax credit. See I.R.C.
§ 46(g) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
15. Taxpayers receiving full investment credit benefits would receive the credit, as calculated
supra note 11, over and above the floor created by I.R.C. § 46(g) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), See
infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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II. THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT AND THE ITC: THE MECHANICS
OF APPLICATION
Congress enacted' 6 the MMA to stimulate the growth and moderni-
zation of the United States merchant fleet. 7 In order to stimulate new
investment, the MMA provides a subsidy for ship construction in the
form of a tax deferral,' 8 A vessel owner 19 can deposit cash into any of
three "accounts,"2 which may be commingled for investment pur-
16. According to the Senate Report, "[t]he purpose of the legislation is to revitalize our
merchant marine by providing a long range merchant shipbuilding program of 300 ships in the
next 10 years .. " S. REP. No. 1080, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4188, 4188. Furthermore, "[slection 21 [of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970] would
entitle certain shipping companies to defer payment of income taxes upon agreement to deposit
this income into a fund to replace or add new ships for use in the U.S.-flag merchant marine....
The privilege [of using tax deferrals] is being extended to presently unsubsidized American flag
carriers." Id at 39, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4212-13.
17. The size and quality of the United States merchant marine declined precipitously be-
tween 1945 and 1970. Id at 9-17, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4189-91.
See also Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 568, 570-74 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
(explains the problem and the MMA solution).
18. For an illustration of the value of a tax deferral, see infra notes 27 & 135.
19. A qualified vessel owner is "[any citizen of the United States owning or leasing one or
more eligible vessels .... 46 U.S.C. § 1177(a) (1976). An eligible vessel is any ship:
(A) constructed in the United States and, if reconstructed, reconstructed in the
United States,
(B) documented under the laws of the United States, and
(C) operated in the foreign or domestic commerce of the United States or in the
fisheries of the United States.
Any vessel which (i) was constructed outside of the United States but documented under
the laws of the United States on April 15, 1970 or (ii) constructed outside the United
States for use in the United States foreign trade pursuant to a contract entered into
before April 15, 1970, shall be treated as [an eligible vessel]....
Id. § 1177(K)(1).
20. There is no floor on the amount that a taxpayer must deposit each year to his capital
construction fund. There is, however, a ceiling on yearly deposits, equal to the sum of: (1) taxable
income for the year, (2) depreciation expenses allowable under Section 167 of the Code, (3) pro-
ceeds from the disposition of vessels purchased using cash from the capital construction fund, and
(4) income on the investments held in the capital construction fund. Id. § 1177(b). For a general
explanation, see S. REP. No. 1080, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 44-46, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4188,4217-20. These deposits go into three accounts: the capital account, the capital
gain account, and the ordinary income account. The capital account contains funds that did not
result in any tax deferral, such as tax exempt interest income earned on debt instruments held as
investments by the fund. The capital gain account contains the proceeds of any transaction that is
tax deferred and that yields long term capital gains. An example of a transaction eligible for tax
deferral and deposit to this account is the sale of a vessel acquired using capital construction
funds. Finally, the ordinary income account contains only "deposits which resulted in the deferral
of ordinary income tax." Id at 48, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4222. See
46 U.S.C. § 1177(e)(4) (1976). Examples of deposits to this account include interest income, short
term capital gains, and ordinary income arising from the operation of ships covered by an agree-
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poses, and can take a deduction in the deposit year equal to the amount
of that deposit. These accounts, which are jointly referred to as the
capital construction fund, are not subject to the accumulated earnings
tax.2 In the event of a nonqualified withdrawal 22 from the fund, the
vessel owner must recapture and pay, with interest,23 the taxes deferred
ment between the vessel owner and the Secretary of Commerce. For further discussion of the
operation of the three accounts and other related rules, see generally Blackwell, Implementation of
the Merchant MarineAct of 1970, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 167 (1974); Gallagher, Maritime Tax: The
Capital Construction Fund of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 105 (1974);
Lewis, Merchant Marine Act of 1970 Changes and Improves Available Tax Incentives, 34 J. TAX'N
300 (1971); Merrigan, New Tax Saving Opportunitiesfor Small Watercraft, 'Sea Tug' Crew Boats
and Fishing Boats Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, 21 TUL. TAX INST. 327 (1972); Rich-
ardson, Capital Construction Funds Under the Merchant Marine Act, 29 TAX L. REv. 751 (1974);
Seago, Investing in Ships: Amendments to Merchant Marine Act Open Up New Tax Shelter, 37 J.
TAX' N 306 (1972); Seago, Using a Capital Construction Fund to Defer Income from Shpping and
Fishing Vessels, 8 TAx ADViSER 541 (1977).
21. In order to avoid frustrating the purpose of the capital construction fund, that is, the
accumulation of capital for the acquisition of new American-made vessels, Congress exempted the
fund from the accumulated earnings penalty. 46 U.S.C. § 1177(d)(1)(E) (1976).
22. Any withdrawal made pursuant to the agreement signed between the Commerce Depart-
ment and the ship owner constitutes a qualified withdrawal. The withdrawal, however, may only
be for purposes of acquiring, constructing or reconstructing a qualified vessel or barge. Id.
§ 1177(0. With respect to nonqualified withdrawals:
(h)(1) [Amny withdrawal from the fund [except withdrawals for research and develop-
ment on ship designs] which is not a qualified withdrawal shall be treated as a
nonqualified withdrawal.
(2) Any nonqualified withdrawal from a fund shall be treated-
(A) first as made out of the ordinary income account,
(B) second as made out of the capital gain account, and
(C) third as made out of the capital account.
(3) For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code...
(A) any [withdrawal from an ordinary income account] shall be included in
income as an item of ordinary income for the taxable year in which the
withdrawal is made,
(B) any amount [withdrawn from the capital gain account] shall be included in
income for the taxable year in which the withdrawal is made as an item of
gain realized during such year from the disposition of an asset held for
more than 6 months.
Id. § 1177(h)(l)-(3).
23. A nonqualified withdrawal may result in an increase in tax liability for the period be-
cause the amount of the withdrawal may be included as ordinary income. See supra note 22. The
IRS imposes an interest charge that is calculated on the amount of the deposit, in the tax year in
which the deposit occurs, and compounds the interest until the year of the nonqualified with-
drawaL Id. § 1177(h)(3)(C)(ii). This interest charge is not a penalty. Congress designed the
charge to discourage the use of the capital construction fund for purposes not contemplated in the
Merchant Marine Act of 1970. The interest charge is an attempt to put the taxpayer in the same
position as one who had never received the tax deferral. S. REP. No. 1080, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 52,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4188, 4226. The IRS recalculates applicable
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as a result of the earlier deductions. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) does not tax withdrawals from the fund provided the cash is rein-
vested in an eligible vessel.24 If the owner later sells the vessel, the
disposition triggers recapture unless the owner redeposits the cash into
the capital construction fund. 5
In order to prevent the taxpayer from receiving a double tax benefit
from the same funds, the IRS reduces the taxpayer's depreciable basis
in an eligible vessel by the amount of money withdrawn from a capital
construction fund and invested in that vessel.26 The IRS thus recovers
the tax benefits of the early deductions from gross income over the life
of the asset through reduced depreciation deductions.27 In effect, the
interest rates each year. See, e.g., Notice 81-12, 1981-2 C.B. 543 (interest rates for tax year 1981
set at 12.41%).
24. See supra notes 19 & 22.
25. The owner must include any gain on the sale of a vessel as ordinary income for that tax
year unless he redeposits such gain in the capital construction fund. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1177(d)(1)(B),
1177(g)(5) (1976). Because basis in a new vessel is reduced to the extent of capital construction
funds used to purchase the vessel, the gain for tax purposes, and the resulting tax liability, could
be substantial. In contrast, the gain for book or cash purposes might be relatively small. See also
infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (contrasting treatment of basis for ITC and depreciation
purposes).
26. Id. § 1177(g)(2)-(4).
27. This concept is best illustrated using a simple numerical example based on the following
fact pattern. Doe Corporation will earn gross revenues of$1,000,000 per year for at least the next
20 years, and that the company plans to buy a new ship in year six. Doe's current vessels are fully
depreciated as of year one and will have a zero fair market value in year five, and the new ship
will cost $500,000 and have a five year useful life. Because Doe's assets are fully depreciated, it
has no depreciation expenses in years one through five. Rather, it takes a deduction for each
annual deposit of $100,000 to the capital construction fund. In years six through ten, Doe still has
no depreciation expenses for tax purposes because the acquisition costs have been fully recovered,
and depreciable basis reduced dollar for dollar, by virtue of the withdrawal of capital construction
fund cash to purchase the vessel. See supra note 26.
Example 1: assume money has no time value (this assumption will be relaxed in example two).
Thus, after five years the company has accumulated $500,000. Its income statements for tax pur-
poses will resemble Fig. 1-1. Note that in section B of Fig. 1-1, the government recovers the total
tax benefit gained in the first five years via reduced depreciation deductions mandated by the basis
reduction provisions. The taxpayer has received three benefits: (1) the loan of taxes that would
normally be paid to the government, (2) the ability to accumulate $100,000 per year for future ship
purchases, and (3) an exemption from the accumulated earnings tax, see supra note 21.
Example 2: Assume money has a time value, assume a 10% interest rate, and to simplify the
analysis, assume that the capital construction fund does not earn income. Assume further that the
other facts of the first example are the same. During years one through five, the government lends
the taxpayer $50,000 per year in the form of deferred taxes. The taxpayer thus has the use of this
money for five years (see Fig. 1-2, Deferred Taxes). The government recovers this tax money in
years six through ten. The difference between present value of the taxes deferred and the present
value of the taxes recovered, or $71,853, is the net gain to the taxpayer as a result of the deferral.
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MMA provides an interest-free loan in the amount of the taxes de-
ferred; the government recovers the principal of this loan over the life
of the asset through the diminished depreciation deductions. The inter-
est that could be earned on the "loan" represents the "loan's" time
value and constitutes a subsidy to the investor.2"
In contrast to a tax deferral, the investment tax credit directly and
often permanently, depending on the method which the taxpayer
chooses, reduces an asset owner's tax liability.29 The Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), 0 has made the ITC a hy-
brid of sorts by permitting the taxpayer to elect between two alterna-
The principle in the capital construction fund earned interest at the rate of 10%, but this income
flow was not analyzed in this example in order to simplify the analysis. For those who wish to see
an analysis of the fund's investment income, Example 3 will prove enlightening.
Example 3: The fund's investment income is tax free as long as it is invested in an eligible
vessel. Because basis in new ships is reduced dollar for dollar for any cash in the ordinary income
account used to purchase the new vessel, the government eventually taxes any income earned on
the account, again in the form of reduced depreciation deductions. Assuming that annual deposits
to a capital construction fund are designed to permit the purchase of a $500,000 asset at the end of
year five, each yearly deposit would be $74,453.40. This calculation is analogous to a bond sink-
ing fund, in which equal amounts of cash are set aside each year to retire the principle when it
matures. In terms of arithmetic calculations, the fund is treated herein as if it were a five year
annuity in advance. The example in Fig. 1-1 was simplified to make the numbers more illustrative
of simple principles. A more realistic portrayal appears in Fig. 1-3: Deposits to the fund are made
at the beginning of each year. Withdrawal is on day one of year 6. The right to use a tax deferral
is worth approximately $70,562 to the taxpayer. See figures on the following pages.
28. See supra note 27, Example 2.
29. Tax credits directly reduce a taxpayer's tax liability on a dollar for dollar basis. Deduc-
tions are merely subtractions from gross income. Deductions reduce tax liability in an amount
approximately equal to the average tax rate times the amount of the deduction. A $100 tax credit
would reduce taxes payable by $100. Assuming a 50% average tax rate, a $100 deduction however
would reduce taxes payable by only $50.
30. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). TEFRA makes
one significant change for present purposes. It permits the taxpayer to use 10% as the regular
percentage but requires a reduction in depreciable basis by 50% of the credit determined under
§ 46(a)(2). I.R.C. § 48(q)(1) (West Supp. 1983). In the alternative, the taxpayer may elect to use
8% as the regular percentage; such taxpayers receive this reduced credit in lieu of any basis adjust-
ments. Id. § 48(q)(4).
The impact of these changes depends upon the taxpayer's choice of treatment. If a taxpayer
wants a large, immediate tax reduction, he will use 10% as the regular percentage. Section 48(q)
converts half of this ITC, or 5%, into a tax deferral by requiring a basis reduction. Thus, only 50%
of the credit is unrecovered asset cost reduction, see infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text,
while the remainder of the credit is recovered in part over the depreciable life of the asset. If the
taxpayer elects to use the § 48(q)(4) election, however, then the taxpayer may use an 8% ITC with
no basis reductions-and therefore no recovery of the ITC by the I.R.S. Congress altered the ITC
rules because it believed that the ACRS in tandem with a 10% ITC was an overly severe drain on
federal revenues, and caused misallocations of private investment. See general S. REP. No. 97-
494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 122, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD NEws 109 (Sept. 1982).
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tives. A taxpayer may claim the regular percentage and suffer a
reduction in depreciable basis, which converts part of the ITC into a
mere tax deferral; or he can choose to take a smaller regular percentage
for the ITC without a concomitant reduction in depreciable basis.3'
Because of its impact on asset cost, the ITC substantially reduces the
amount of income the asset must generate to satisfy required rate of
return calculations. 2 With respect to the American Merchant fleet, the
ITC makes investments in American vessels substantially more attrac-
31. Seesupra note 30. Congress passed TEFRA after this Note was prepared for publication;
thus, the reader will find in this Note no substantive analysis of TEFRA's impact. It is important
to point out, however, that TEFRA changes a few of the numbers involved, but not the funda-
mental arguments.
Consider, for example, the merchant shipper who purchases a vessel using only capital con-
struction fund (CCF) monies. Such a taxpayer must reduce depreciable basis in-the vessel for
each dollar of CCF cash used in making the acquisition. See Supra note 26 and accompanying
text. Suppose that a taxpayer purchased an eligible vessel costing $100x using only CCF cash to
finance the purchase. Taxpayer's depreciable basis would be zero. Section 46(g)(2) would treat
only S50x as qualified investment. See infra note 37. A taxpayer attempting to use 10% as the
regular percentage could claim $5x as an ITC, but he would be unable to reduce basis by 50% of
the credit granted (50% of $5x = $2.5x), as required by § 46(q)(1). I.R.C. § 46(q)(l)(West Supp.
1983). The taxpayer could only receive $2.5x, or 5% of $50x as an ITC, because use of the other
half of the regular percentage (here 10%) requires a basis reduction. The taxpayer could also
litigate the status of the other $50x of investment in an effort to force the I.R.S. to treat it as
qualified investment and thus grant an additional $2.5x of ITC. See I.R.C. § 46(g)(6)(1976). Of
course, such litigation would focus on the issues discussed in this Note--the meaning of basis for
ITC purposes.
If the taxpayer in the example above were to elect under § 48(q)(4), however, he could claim
without litigation 8% of $50x, or $4x, as an ITC. I.R.C. § 48(q)(4)(West Supp. 1982). The tax-
payer could then litigate the qualified investment issues in an effort to get the remaining $4x (that
is, 8% of the other $50x of asset cost, the total cost being $100x, as stated above) that would
normally be available to taxpayers using accelerated depreciation methods. The election avoids
the basis problem for shipowners who have no basis left to reduce, but requires the litigants to
confront again the central issue in this Note-the availability of the ITC to taxpayers who use
CCF cash, which reduces depreciable basis but which should not (under the § 48(q)(4) election)
reduce basis for ITC purposes.
32. The commonly accepted formula used for determining the required rate of return is
denoted as the capital asset pricing model. The model's formula is: K. = KRF + (KM - KRF1
where Ke = the required rate of return, KRF = is the risk free rate of interest, KM = the required
return on the market index, and 3 = the risk of asset A with respect to the market index, or 13
COVAM
Va-M See 0. JoY, INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 71-89 (2d ed.) (1980); J. VANVar m
HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 60-106 (5th ed. 1980).
Assuming that K. is the required rate of return, and I is the amount of invested capital, then
(Ke) (1) = average required cash return for an investment having simple, uniform cash flows. If
the investment credit reduces the cost of the asset acquired, then the average required cash return
will fall as well. That is, as I is decreasing, the product of (K.) (I) declines as well.
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tive. 33 Congress declared, in the Revenue Act of 1962, that the ITC
should affect all American-made depreciable assets in this way.34 De-
spite an unusual history of suspensions and reinstatements, 35 the ITC's
initial policy format remains unchanged. The credit is designed to spur
new investment in depreciable assets which are used in a trade or busi-
ness or for the production of income.3 6
The Code speaks directly to the relationship between the MMA and
the ITC. Section 46(g) permits a taxpayer, who acquires a vessel with
cash from a capital construction fund, to take 50% of the maximum
credit available under the ITC provisions 37 of the Code. That is, the
statute entitles the taxpayer to claim up to 5% of cost basis, depending
on the asset's useful life, as an investment credit. Yet section 46(g) de-
clares that it raises no inference as to whether any property is or is not
depreciable property qualified for the ITC under section 38.38 Thus, if
33. As the investment tax credit reduces the cost of investment in a depreciable asset, it also
reduces the cash return required as compared to other alternative investments. This tends to en-
courage ship owners to purchase the more costly American-made vessels. See Sunley, The Proper
Role of the Investment Tax Credit, 69 PRoC. ANN. CONF. NA't'L TAX ASS'N-TAx INST. AM. 205,
206 (1976).
34. S. REP. No. 1881,supra note 1, at 10-1I, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 3313.
35. See infra note 53.
36. I.R.C. § 38 (1976) requires that the assets be depreciable. To be depreciable, I.R.C.
§ 167(a)(l)-(2) (1976 & West Supp. 1982) requires that the property be used either in a trade or
business or held for the production of income.
37. Section 46(g) provides in relevant part:
(2) Amount of Credit
For purposes of paragraph (1), the amount of qualified investment shall be 50 percent
of the applicable percentage of the qualified withdrawal referred to in paragraph (1), or
the amount of the qualified progress expenditures shall be 50 percent of such withdrawal
as the case may be. For purposes of determining the amount of the credit allowable by
reason of this subsection for any taxable year, the limitation of subsection (a)(3) shall be
determined without regard to subsection (d)(l)A of such section 607 [of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1970].
(3) Coordination with Section 38
The amount of the credit allowable by reason of this subsection with respect to any
property shall be the minimum amount allowable under Section 38 with respect to such
property. If, without regard to this subsection, a greater amount is allowable under Sec-
tion 38 with respect to such property, then such greater amount shall apply and this
subsection shall not apply.
(6) No inference
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to infer that any property described in
this subsection is or is not Section 38 property and any determination of such issue shall
be as if this subsection had not been enacted.
I.R.C. § 46(g)(2),(3),(6)(19 76).
38. See supra note 37 (quoting id. § 46(g)(6)).
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the taxpayer believes that he is entitled to the full investment credit
(10%), section 46(g) leaves him no alternative but to sue for the balance
of the credit not expressly granted by section 46(g)(2). 39 In sum, section
46(g) simply grants an ITC, up to 5% of cost basis, and invites the tax-
payer who wants the full 10% tax credit to seek a judicial declaration of
the depreciable nature of the asset.40 For those making significant in-
vestments in new or reconstructed eligible vessels, the stakes are still
quite high. Section 46(g) offers little assistance, for it fails to resolve the
dispute over the definition of basis for investment credit purposes.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress intended the investment tax credit to encourage the rapid
modernization and replacement of American productive capacity.4
Both the Conference and Senate Reports42 on the Revenue Act of
1962 4 advert to asset cost reduction as the means by which the ITC
39. Id. § 46(g)(2) created a floor for tax credits claimed by eligible vessel owners under the
Merchant Marine Act of 1970. If the taxpayer believes he is entitled to the ceiling amount, the
regular percentage described in id. § 46(a)(2)(B) (Supp IV 1980), then he must sue for a court
determination as to whether his property is depreciable-a requirement for the ITC. Section
46(g)(6) raises no inference about whether an asset is depreciable. Id. § 46(g)(6) (1976). See infra
notes 142-43 (defining depreciable property).
40. See supra note 39. See generally Cook, Brodie, & Granwell, Shioping and Fishing Indus-
tries are Affected by Tax Reform Act of 1976, 46 J. TAX'N 88 (1977); Seago, supra note 20. Note
that in creating a floor on the investment credits allowable to taxpayers using capital construction
funds, Congress overruled, in part, two prior Revenue Rulings on the subject. See Rev. Rul. 68-
468, 1968-2 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 67-395, 1967-2 C.B. 11.
41. S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 1, at 10-11, 18, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 3313-14, 3320.
42. The Senate Report states:
Realistic depreciation [through guidelines on tax lives] alone, however, is not enough to
provide the essential economic growth. In addition, a specific incentive must be pro-
vided if a higher rate of growth is to be achieved. The investment credit will stimulate
investment,first by reducing the net cost of acquiring depreciable assets, which in turn
increases the rate of return after taxes arising from their acquisition.
S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 1, at 11, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 3314
(emphasis added). The Conference Report reaffirms this view of the purpose of the investment
credit:
It is the understanding of the conferees on the part of both the House and the Senate that
the purapose of the credit for investment in certain depreciable property.. . is to en-
courage modernization and expansion of the Nation's productive facilities and to im-
prove its economic potential by reducing the net cost of acquiring new equipment...
CONF. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3732, 3734 (emphasis added).
43. The investment tax credit was passed as part of the Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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was to accomplish this purpose.' President Kennedy expressed a simi-
lar view in a report to Congress strongly urging passage of the Revenue
Act.45 Congress thus regarded the ITC as a means of stimulating the
economy by providing an incentive to investment.46 This incentive
would not only increase the rate of return on new capital assets, but
would also increase cash flow available for investment by lowering a
business's tax liability.47
Congress suspended the ITC in 1967 and again in 1969 in order to
cool inflationary pressures.48 Countercyclical fiscal policy49 and the no-
tion of economic fine tuning50 were in vogue. The suspensions were a
part of the regnant Keynesian economic policies and were not rejec-
tions of the cost reduction approach represented by the ITC. Indeed,
when Congress reenacted the ITC at the behest of the Nixon adminis-
tration,5' Treasury Secretary Connelly testified favorably on the merits
44. It is interesting to note that, in attempting to calculate the estimated revenue impact of
the proposed investment tax credit, the Treasury Department assumed that for purposes of analy-
sis the investment credit should be treated as a reduction in the cost of the asset. The Treasury
Department used this assumption in its econometric analysis of the revenue impact of the ITC. S.
REP. No. 1881, supra note 1, at 7-10, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3310-12.
45. Economic Report to Congress, 108 CONG. REC. 584 (1962).
46. Many analysts treat the investment tax credit as a cost reduction incentive for new invest-
ment. See Brannon, The Revenue Act of 1971-Do Tax Incentives Have New Life?, 14 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 891 (1973); Brown, Comments on Tax Credits as Investment Incentives, 15 NAT'L
TAX J. 198 (1962); Taubman, The Investment Tax Credit, Once More, 14 B.C. INDUS. & CoMt. L.
REV. 871 (1973); Note, MAPI Study Shows Investment Incentives of Investment Credit and Depreci-
ation Rules, 18 J. TAX'N 2 (1963). See also Chase, Tax Creditsfor Investment Spending, 15 NAT'L
TAX J. 32 (1962); Johnson & Carey, The Effect of the Investment Credit on Equipment Replacement
Decisions, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 307 (1970); Johnson & Newton, Tax Considerations in Equipment
Replacement Decisions, 1967 AccT. REv. 738; White, Illusions in the Marginal Investment Subsidy,
15 NAT'L TAX J. 26 (1962).
47. S. REP. No. 1881,supra note 1, at 10-ll,reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 3313-14. For a discussion of the required rate of return concept and the cash flow implications
of asset cost reduction, see supra note 31.
48. See infra notes 49 & 53.
49. Countercyclical fiscal policy involves use of government expenditure policies to either
stimulate or depress the economy, as needed. See R. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS 15 (1978). See
generally Cook, The Investment Credit-In vestment Incentive and Countercyclical Tool, 45 TAXES
227 (1967). This policy approach was the motivating force behind the 1967 temporary suspension
of the investment credit. S. REP. No. 1724, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-14, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4327, 4331-41. A similar policy view was expressed in support of the "termi-
nation" of the credit in 1969. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 178, reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1645, 1832.
50. See. e.g., R. GORDON, supra note 49, at 394-416.
51. The investment credit was restored in the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85
Stat. 497 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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of the ITC's asset cost reduction approach.52 Thus, despite suspensions
and subsequent reenactments,13 the intent of the ITC has not changed
since 1962. Courts still look to the Revenue Act of 1962 for guidance in
determining the congressional intent of sections 38, 46, 47, and 48."
The purpose of the ITC has never really changed despite suspensions
motivated by fiscal policy concerns. 5  Those court decisions that reject
52. Hearings on the RevenueAct of1971 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92nd Cong., Ist
Sess. 5 (1971) (statement of Treasury Secretary John Connally).
53. The investment credit was suspended in 1966, Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80
Stat. 1508 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), and reinstated shortly thereafter, Act of
June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); it was
reinstated in 1971, Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.). The suspension merely denied the tax credit for a limited period; it did not
change the operational language of the credit. Similarly the restoration of the credit by § 50 sim-
ply reactivated the provisions enacted in the Revenue Act of 1962. Section 50 read in part:
Section 50. Restoration of Credit
(a) General Rule
Section 49(a) (relating to termination of credit) shall not apply to property-
(1) the construction, reconstruction or erection of which-
(A) is completed by a taxpayer after August 15, 1971 or
(2) which is acquired by the taxpayer-
(A) after August 15, 1971 or...
I.R.C. § 50 (1976). The Revenue Act of 1971 also changed the title of§ 49 from "Termination of
Credit" to "Termination for Period Beginning April 19, 1969 and Ending During 1971." 26 U.S.C.
§ 49 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (sections 49 and 50 deleted entirely by Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)).
The investment credit as reenacted is
substantially similar to the investment credit allowed under prior law. The three princi-
pal differences are (1) the useful life brackets. . . are to be shortened by one year, (2) the
credit is not. . .allowed for foreign produced machinery and equipment and (3) public
utility property is to be eligible for a four per cent credit.
S. REP. No. 437, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 25, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1825,
1833-34. Thus the restoration of the investment credit did not involve any fundamental reorienta-
tion of the original provisions. Later changes to the investment credit section simply liberalized
the credit amounts available. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 112-13, 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6761, 6875-76 (making the new 10% figure permanent as the regular
percentage in I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(B) and expanding the limitation on investment tax credit usage in
§ 46(a)(3)(B) to 90% of tax liability).
Thus, it is reasonable to look to the Congressional Reports of the Revenue Act of 1962 for an
explanation of legislative intent. Since 1962 Congress' alterations of the credit have been to its
amount or availability and not to the policy undergirding the statute.
54. See, e.g., Holloman v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1977); Farmer's Grain Mktg.
Terminal v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 368 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v.
United States, 654 F.2d 35 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Oblebay Norton Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 715 (Ct.
Cl. 1979); Pacific Far E. Lines v. United States, 544 F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1976); States S.S. Co. v.
United States, 428 F.2d 832 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981); Weirick
v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 446 (1974).
55. See supra note 53.
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asset cost reduction as the theory underlying the ITC are thus inconsis-
tent with the legislative history.5
6
Congress contemplated determining the general accounting treat-
ment for the ITC, but ultimately declined to do so for all firms except
public utilities. 7 This decision is significant because the flow-through
method adopts a tax reduction approach to the investment credit while
the deferral method is based more on an asset cost reduction approach.
For financial accounting purposes, the flow-through method uses the
entire tax credit to reduce the tax expense for the accounting period.5
The deferral method, on the other hand, adopts an asset cost reduction
approach by requiring a rough matching of tax credit benefits to the
useful life of the asset generating the credit.5 9 Thus a congressional
choice of one of these accounting techniques would have represented a
substantial policy statement on the legislative intent with respect to the
ITC. Congress ultimately adopted a neutral position on the financial
accounting issue.6" Both the deferral and the flow-through methods,6'
56. Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981).
57. The Revenue Act of 1971 allowed each taxpayer to choose which method of accounting
to use for the investment tax credit. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 101(c), 85 Stat.
497. For public utility investment, however, Congress declared that utilities using the flow-
through method for reporting and ratemaking purposes would be ineligible, in general, for the
investment credit. See I.R.C. § 46(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
58. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION No. 4 (1964). See generalI), 3 AICPA, PRO-
FESSIONAL STANDARDS-AcCOUNTING § 4094 (1981); D. KIEso & J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE
ACCOUNTING 534-36 (3rd ed. 1980).
59. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD-OPINION No. 2 (1962). See generally 3 AICPA, PRO-
FESSIONAL STANDARDS-ACCOUNTING, supra note 58; D. KIEso & J. WEYGANDT, supra note 58.
60. See supra note 57.
61. The Professional Standards text lists both the deferral and the flow-through methods as
acceptable. The text suggests a decided preference for the deferral method, however, because it is
more consistent with existing accounting principles and because it reflects more accurately the cost
reduction approach of the investment credit. 3 AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS-ACCOUNTING
§ 4094.07-11 (1981). The Accounting Principles Board approved the flow-through method only
because it was more popular than the deferral approach. This popularity was a result of its imme-
diate and drastic impact on the income statement. The Accounting Principles Board thus came
under substantial pressure to change its ruling in APB No. 2. It did so in APB No. 4, effectively
allowing both methods. Both the opinions embodied in APB No. 4 and in § 4094 of the Profes-
sional Standards text, however, show substantial uneasiness with respect to the flow-through
method. Thus, the Professional Standards text notes in its Conclusion:
.16 However, the authority of Opinions of this Board rests upon their general accepta-
bility. The Board, in the light of events and developments occurring since the issu-
ance of Opinion No. 2, has determined that its conclusions as there expressed have
not attained the degree of acceptability which it believes is necessary to make the
Opinion effective.
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therefore, are permitted under generally accepted accounting
principles. 2
Congress did explicitly define, however, the intent of the ITC as asset
cost reduction and the stimulation thereby of additional investment. 3
Ambiguity in the financial accounting rules should not inhibit a frank
recognition by the courts of the legislative history of the ITC. Further-
more, virtually all analysts treat the ITC, for purposes of financial anal-
ysis and decisionmaking as opposed to mere financial accounting
conventions, as an asset cost reduction benefit.64 Moreover, the Treas-
ury Department itself used the cost reduction approach in preparing its
estimates of the ITC's impact on federal tax revenues.6 5
IV. THE MEANING OF BASIS
A. Statutory Analysis
Generally, the basis of property equals the cost of that property.66 In
determining the amount of investment credit that a taxpayer may take
under section 46, Regulation 1.46-3(c) provides that the basis of section
38 property shall be found in accordance with the general rule.67 As-
suming no exceptions 68 are relevant to the determination of basis for
.17 Under the circumstances the Board believes that, while the method of accounting
for the investment credit recommended in paragraph .11 [the deferral method]
should be considered to be preferable the alternative fflow through method] ... is
also acceptable.
3 AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS-AccOUNTING § 4094.16-.17 (1981).
62. "Generally accepted accounting principles encompass the conventions, rules, and proce-
dures necessary to define accepted accounting practice at a particular time." ACCOUNTING PRIN-
CIPLES BOARD, Statement No. 4-Basic Concepts and Accounting Princples Underlying Financial
Statements ofBasiness Enterprlses, 138 (1970), in 2 APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPALS (1972).
63. See supra note 42.
64. Some dispute exists over the appropriate financial accounting treatment, see supra notes
57-62 and accompanying text. For decisionmaking purposes, the investment credit is obviously a
cost reduction factor. See supra note 46 (listing analysts, some of whom constructed sophisticated
statistical models, using the cost reduction concept).
65. See supra note 44.
66. I.R.C. § 1012 (1976) reads in relevant part as follows: "The basis ofproperty shall be the
cost of such property, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter and subchapters C [corpo-
rate distributions], K [partnerships], and P (capital gains and losses]." Id
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3(c)(1) (1964) provides in relevant part:
[t]he basis of any new section 38 property shall be determined with the general rules for
determining the basis of property. Thus the basis of property would generally be its cost
(see section 1012), unreduced by the adjustment to basis provided by section 48(g)(1)
. . . and any other adjustment to basis, such as that for depreciation...
id
68. See supra note 66.
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ITC purposes, the basis of section 38 property should therefore equal
the taxpayer's cost.
The basis reduction provisions of the MMA 69 are special rules not
contained in the Code. Thus, the determination of basis for investment
credit purposes should proceed in accordance with the general direc-
tives of the Code.7" To do otherwise would be to violate the internal
symmetry of the Code by injecting the MMA's cost recovery program
into the ITC's asset cost reduction system.7 Normally, one would sug-
gest as a matter of statutory construction that general rules of a statute
apply except where preempted by specific portions of that statute.72
The MMA, however, is a special system outside the Code. Congress
designed the MMA to effectuate a cost recovery concept inherent in a
tax deferral system.73 The ITC, on the other hand, is a cost reduction
scheme whose basis rules were drafted in contemplation of the Code's
own internal system. The Code's general rules, therefore, should be
used to determine basis for the ITC, because the specific rules on the
subject are contained in a different statute, separate and distinct from
the Code's internal system.74 This view seems especially plausible be-
cause the MMA did not contemplate interaction with the investment
tax credit; Congress terminated the ITC in 196971 before enacting the
MMA in 1970.
69. 46 U.S.C. § 1177(g) (1976).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.46-(3)(c)(1) (1964) suggests that the taxpayer follow the "general rules for
determining basis." Id See supra note 67. The general rule is the cost basis approach given in
I.R.C. § 1012 (1976). See supra note 66. The general rule, therefore, should apply to those bene-
fiting from the Merchant Marine Act provisions. See Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428
1981) (Goffe, J., dissenting).
71. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. See also Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77
T.C. 428 (1981) (Goffe, J., dissenting).
72. See generally 2 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ch. 40 (4th ed.
1973); 3 id Ch. 66 (4th ed. 1974).
73. A tax deferral simply postpones the tax burden eventually incurred by the taxpayer. The
Merchant Marine Act's deferral system is closely analogous to accelerated depreciation. See infra
notes 13040 and accompanying text. The Treasury Department apparently agreed that the
Merchant Marine Act was a deferral system. "Under section 607 [46 U.S.C. § 1177(g)], tax is
deferred on deposits in reserve funds of all or any portion of a firm's earnings as well as earnings
on prior fund deposits... :' Letter from Roy T. Englert, Acting General Counsel of the Treas-
ury, to Hon. Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman Committee on Commerce (April 15, 1970), re-
printed in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4243, 4244 [hereinafter cited as Englert Letter].
74. See Englert Letter, supra note 73. at 4245 (problems created by enacting tax deferral
legislation outside the Internal Revenue Code underscored by General Counsel).
75. For a discussion of the relevant legislative history, see supra note 53.
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'The legislative history76 of the ITC buttresses the view that basis for
investment credit purposes equals the cost to the taxpayer. The tax-
payer's use of tax deferred funds under the capital construction fund
program should have no effect upon this determination of basis.
77
When a taxpayer invests cash from the fund in an eligible vessel, he
essentially borrows a portion of those funds from the government.7
He repays the "loan" without interest over the asset's life.79 Because,
under these circumstances, the IRS considers borrowed funds at risk
for ITC purposes, 0 the taxpayer has sustained the full burden of
76. See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
77. Pacific Far E. Lines v. United States, 544 F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1976). In Paciflc, the court of
claims argued that Treas. Reg. § 1.46- 3(c) requires that basis be determined in accordance with
the general rules, and that I.R.C. § 1012 (1976)and Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (1957) describe the
general rule. See supra notes 66-67. Accordingly, the court concluded that shippers using tax
deferred funds to purchase eligible vessels should receive an investment credit calculated on cost
basis, irrespective of the source of the funds. 544 F.2d at 485. The court also observed that "the
'general rules for determining basis of property' referred to by the House and Senate Committees
and the Treasury's regulation, have no reference to whether the funds spent as part of the (cost) of
the property had their source in untaxed income." Id
78. By depositing cash into a capital construction fund, the taxpayer receives a current de-
duction that increases his cash inflow by reducing his tax liability. See supra note 27. The govern-
ment "lends" the taxpayer an amount equal to the taxes deferred each year. The loan is recovered
without interest over the asset's life in the form of reduced depreciation deductions. This tax
deferral system resembles a form of accelerated depreciation because it accelerates the benefits of
a portion of future deductions to the current period. The taxpayer using the capital construction
fund, however, may accelerated the depreciation deduction benefits to a period prior to asset ac-
quisition, and thus may use part of the increased current income, created by the tax deferral, to
finance the purchase of a new vessel.
79. See supra note 78.
80. Section 46(c)(8) states in relevant part:
(8) Limitation to Amount at risk.-
(A) In general.-In the case of new or used section 38 property which-
(i) is placed in service during the taxable year by a taxpayer described in
Section 465(a)(1), and
(ii) is used in connection with an activity with respect to which any loss is
subject to limitation under Section 465,
the basis of such property for purposes of paragraph I [of Section 46(c)] shall not exceed
the amount the taxpayer is at risk with respect to such property as of the close of such
taxable year.
(B) Amount at risk.-
(i) In general.- Except as provided in clause (ii), the term at risk has the
same meaning given such term by section 465(b) (without regard to para-
graph 5 thereof)
(ii) Certain financing.- In the case of a taxpayer who at all times is at risk
.. . in an amount equal to 20 percent of the basis... [then such person
shall be considered at risk to the extent of]...
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purchasing an asset in an arm's length transaction."' In accordance
with the general rules in the Code, the taxpayer's basis must equal his
cost.8
2
To reduce the basis for ITC purposes by the amount of the capital
construction funds used is either to declare that borrowed funds are not
at risk, the converse of the interpretations to date or to reduce basis by
the amount of the depreciation83 taken in advance of purchase, an ac-
tion seemingly precluded by the Treasury Regulations.84 Under the
first view, if a tax deferral is analogous to an interest-free loan, reduc-
ing basis by the amount of tax deferred funds used is equivalent to
declaring that borrowed funds are not at risk.85 Under the second al-
(II) . . . a loan from any Federal, State, or local government or instru-
mentality thereof, is guaranteed by any Federal, State or local
government.
I.R.C. § 46(c)(8) (West Supp. 1982).
Section 46(c)(8) requires that a taxpayer be limited for purposes of § 46(c)(1) (dealing with
qualified investment) to amounts at risk. Id. § 46(c)(8). The taxpayer has in effect borrowed
funds equal to the taxes deferred to help finance new ship purchases. The taxpayer meets the 20%
requirement of § 46(c)(8)(B)(ii), as the determination of this issue leads to § 168(d)(1)(A), which
finds unadjusted basis under § 1016 without regard to depreciation deductions. Id.
§ 168(d)(l)(A); § 1016 (1976 & West Supp. 1982). Thus, it seems fair to suggest that even if the tax
deferral program under the Merchant Marine Act creates a form of loan to the taxpayer, the loan
is at risk in the newly purchased vessel and the full investment credit ought to be available. If the
taxpayer sells the vessel and does not redeposit the funds into the capital construction fund, the
loan is subject to recapture. See supra note 25. Of course the investment credit would also be
recaptured if the taxpayer disposed of the vessel prior to the end of the applicable useful life
described in I.R.C. § 46(c)(2) (West Supp. 1982), or the class life in I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp.
1982). See id. § 47 (1976 & West Supp. 1982).
81. If the taxpayer has parted with cash, which is at risk in an investment, and the vessel is
purchased in an arm's length transaction, taxpayer must be entitled to the full investment tax
credit. See Oglebay Norton Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 715 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Pacific Far E. Lines
v. United States, 544 F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Cf. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. United States, 654
F.2d 35 (Ct. CI. 1981) (taxpayer entitled to full ITC despite basis adjustment, pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 1017 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), implying basis adjustment per se does not alter amount at risk).
82. See supra notes 66-67 & 81. The asset must be depreciable to be eligible for the invest-
ment credit. See infra notes 171-90 and accompanying text.
83. The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 simply provides for an acceleration of depreciation
deduction benefits to the period in which cash is set aside for new vessel acquisitions, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1177(d) (1976), and a concomitant reduction in basis in the amount of those deductions after
purchase. Id. § 1177(g). This is simply an unusual form of depreciation. Compare Oglebay Nor-
ton Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 715 (Ct. Cl. 1979) and Pacific Far E. Lines v. United States, 544
F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1976) with Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981).
84. See supra note 67. Treas. Reg. 1.46-3(c)(1) (1964) indicates that in calculating the invest-
ment credit, basis is not to be reduced by the amount of depreciation taken.
85. See supra note 80.
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ternative, cost basis would be adjusted for depreciation taken despite a
stipulation to the contrary contained in the Regulations.16 The Com-
missioner,therefore, should allow a taxpayer, who has parted with cash
by virtue of deposits to a capital construction fund and who has subse-
quently invested in depreciable property, to use the acquisition cost as
the basis for calculating the ITC. This is simply an application of the
general rule for determining the basis of property for ITC purposes.87
B. Basis Used to Measure Two Functions-Cost Recovery and Cost
Reduction
The preceding analysis suggests an important concept: asset cost re-
covery and asset cost reduction differ.88 Cost recovery is a process in
which the taxpayer recovers the acquisition price, or expense, of an as-
set through annual depreciation deductions which are subtracted from
gross income.89 In contrast, asset cost reduction involves an attempt to
86. See supra notes 67 & 83-84.
87. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
88. See Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 35 (Ct. CI. 1981); Schmidt
Barge Lines v. United States, 610 F.2d 728 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Oglebay Norton Co. v. United States,
610 F.2d 715 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Delta S.S. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 544 F.2d 496 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Pacific Transp. Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 493 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Pacific Far E. Lines v. United
States, 544 F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See also Moore McCormack Resources, Inc. v. United States,
46 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 80-5075 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
89. See infra note 125. It is important to note that basis is treated differently under asset cost
recovery and asset cost reduction systems. A taxpayer claiming the ITC need not reduce his basis
in the asset. See supra note 30. In contrast, a taxpayer claiming depreciation deductions under
§ 167 must reduce his basis in the asset after each depreciation deduction in order to prevent the
compounding of depreciation benefits in subsequent periods. I.R.C. § 167 (1976 & West Supp,
1982). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(b)-(a); 1.167(b)-I; 1.167(b)-2 T.D. 6712, 1964-1 C.B. 106
(1956). Under § 168's class life system, the depreciation deduction allowable is determined by the
product of the applicable percentage and the property's unadjusted basis. I.R.C. § 168 (West
Supp. 1982). Basis is not adjusted, as under § 167's straight line, double declining balance, or sum
of the year's digits methods for the amount of depreciation taken in the prior year. Rather, unad-
justed basis is "the excess of the basis of the property determined under part II of subchapter 0 of
chapter 1 for purposes of determining gain. . . over the sum of" any § 167 K benefits and any
§ 179 bonus depreciation claimed. Id § 167 (1976 & West Supp. 1982); 1d. § 179 (West Supp.
1982). See also id. § 168(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
Regardless of whether a taxpayer uses the § 167 or the § 168 depreciation deductions, the deter-
mination and adjustment of basis is essential for determining the proper deductions and for
preventing double deductions. I.R.C. § 167 (1976 & West Supp. 1982); id. § 168 (West Supp.
1982). The MMA contains basis reduction rules in order to prevent double deductions: One for
deposits to a capital construction fund, and a second when the taxpayer claims a depreciation
deduction. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. The ITC, of course, does not reduce
basis. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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use the Code to decrease the acquisition cost of certain new equip-
ment.90 Depreciation deductions lower taxable income and allow the
taxpayer to recover the cost of an asset by ultimately reducing taxes
payable. Depreciation does not affect the cost of an asset; it merely
allocates, or accrues, in accounting terms, that cost over a period of
time.91 The ITC, however, represents a legislative effort to reduce the
cost of investment in eligible assets by reducing an investor's tax liabil-
ity by a portion of the acquisition cost.92 Recovering cost through de-
preciation deductions thus differs from reducing acquisition cost via a
reduction in tax liability.
Using the same basis concept for purposes of both cost recovery and
cost reduction perverts the intent of Congress. Basis must be adjusted
in order to prevent capital construction fund users from obtaining
double depreciation deductions. 93 The MMA provides for such adjust-
ments to basis by requiring a dollar for dollar basis reduction for all
capital construction fund money used to acquire eligible vessels.94 To
use the adjusted basis as the base amount upon which the ITC is to be
calculated, however, produces a contradictory result. A taxpayer who
uses capital construction fund cash to purchase a vessel would be de-
nied the ITC to the extent that such money was used in the acquisi-
tion.95 This result is contrary to the clear legislative intent
demonstrated by Congress: namely, to reduce the cost of new invest-
ment.96 Denying the full ITC to those using capital construction fund
money thus confuses the basis concept used to implement a cost recov-
ery program with a basis concept necessary for cost reduction.91
90. Minot Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 435 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1970); Commis-
sioner v. Schuyler Grain Co., 411 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1969); Texas Instruments v. United States,
407 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Texas 1976); Norfolk Shipping & Drydock Corp. v. United States, 321 F.
Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1971). See also supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
91. See generally S. DAVIDSON, C. STICKNEY, & R. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 76 (2nd
ed. 1979).
92. See supra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 89.
94. See suprih note 26.
95. See supra note 89.
96. See supra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
97. This is a fairly subtle point, and judges occasionally fail to grasp its significance. See
Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 544 F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (Cowen, J., dissenting);
Pacific Transp. Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 493 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (Skelton, J., dissenting). In Pacofc
Far East Lines, Judge Cowen argued that basis is the same for all taxation issues, thereby failing
to distinguish between cost recovery and cost reduction. 544 F.2d at 491. In Pacific Transport,
Judge Skelton argued that the allowance of an investment tax credit on the cost of an asset would
Number 41 1367
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Recently, the court of claims rejected an overly restrictive, literal
view of the concept of basis in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. United
States.98 The taxpayer-corporation had repurchased its bonds at a dis-
count, thereby receiving discharge of indebtedness income. Taxpayer
elected under section 10899 to defer recognition of this income by tak-
ing a section 1017 t° adjustment to the basis of depreciable assets. The
IRS claimed that because of the reduction in basis, section 47(a) man-
dated a proportionate recapture of the investment credit.,0 The tax-
permit a double deduction; once upon the taking of a deduction for a capital construction fund
deposit, and again when the tax credit is allowed. 544 F.2d at 493. Judge Skelton failed to recog-
nize, however, that his argument would deny the investment credit to any taxpayer, because the
investment credit is generally permitted in tandem with full depreciation deductions calculated on
the full acquisition price of the asset. Because deposits to a capital construction fund are a kind of
accelerated depreciation, the investment credit should be granted, as it permits cost reduction
while the basis reduction provisions of 46 U.S.C. § 1177(g) (1977) satisfy the cost recovery
problems. Judge Skelton thus confused cost recovery and cost reduction in his arguments.
98. 654 F.2d 35 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
99. Section 108(a)(l)(c) allows an exclusion from gross income for discharge of qualified
business indebtedness income. I.R.C:§ 108(a)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 108(c) requires that
taxpayers who claim the § 108(a)(1)(C) exclusion must "reduce the basis of depreciable property"
by "the amount excluded from gross income." I.R.S. § 108(c) (Supp. IV 1980). For a summary of
the basis reduction provision, see infra note 100.
100. Section 1017(a) requires that "amounts excluded from gross income under subsection (a)
of section 108. . . shall be applied in reduction of the basis of any [depreciable] property held by
the taxpayer." I.R.C. § 1017 (Supp. IV 1981). The effect of the § 108/§ 1017 interaction is to
defer recognition of the income from the discharge of indebtedness. The government recovers the
taxes so deferred over the life of the asset by virtue of the reduced depreciation deductions. A
similar outcome obtains if the asset whose basis is reduced is sold before the end of its useful life,
or class life under I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1982), because the reduced basis results in a larger
gain for tax purposes. This system of deferral and recovery uses the same conceptual approach
employed in the creation of the Merchant Marine Act's system.
101. The case arose under the jurisdiction of the old § 1017 Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3, 301, amendedby Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589,
94 Stat. 3389, 3394. Section 1017, prior to amendment, was unclear with respect to the impact of a
basis reduction on the recapture provisions of I.R.C. § 47(a) (1976 & West Supp. 1982). The IRS
took the position that in the event of such a reduction in basis, recapture under § 47(a) was re-
quired. Section 47 in relevant part requires that:
If during any taxable year any property is disposed of, or otherwise ceases to be Sec-
tion 38 property with respect to the taxpayer, before the close of the useful life which was
taken into account in computing the credit. . . then the tax. . . for such. . . year shall
be increased by an amount equal to the aggregate decrease in the credits allowed under
Section 38 for all prior taxable years which would have resulted solely from substituting,
in determining qualified investment, for such useful life the period beginning with the
time such property was placed into service. . . and ending with the time such property
ceased to be Section 38 property.
Id See Rev. Rul. 74-184, 1974-1 C.B. 8 (amplifying Rev. Rul, 72-248, 1972-1 C.B. 16). This
position was overruled by the addition of I.R.C. § 1017(c) (Supp. IV 1980) in the Bankruptcy Tax
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payer, on the other hand, argued that recapture should occur only
when a price rebate or a disposition decreased the taxpayer's invest-
ment, or cost basis, in the asset.'" 2 The court found the taxpayer's posi-
tion consistent with the purposes of the ITC °3 as well as with the
Regulations"14 promulgated by the IRS."°5 It rejected the IRS's literal
interpretation of the Code.
The Panhandle court viewed basis as both the embodiment of acqui-
sition costs" and as a reservoir of cost to be recovered by depreciation.
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389, 3394 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
See infra note 110.
102. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 35, 38 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
103. Id at 40.
104. Treas. Reg. 1.1017-1(a) (1956) suggests that a § 1017 adjustment to basis is for purposes
of determining gain or loss on disposition of the property and not necessarily as a § 1012 reduction
in cost basis.
105. 654 F.2d at 41. Because taxpayer's investment cost serves as basis for ITC purposes, the
IRS should recapture ITC benefits only upon the occurrence of an event which reduces the cost of
taxpayer's investment in depreciable property; alterations in basis for depreciation purposes
should not affect the ITC.
106. Examples of events which reduce a taxpayer's investment cost are given under Treas.
Reg. 1.47-2(a), (d), (e), T.D. 6931, 1967-2 C.B. 12, as amended by T.D. 7203, 1972-2 C.B. 12. A
taxpayer's cost basis decreases when he removes § 38 property partially or entirely from business
use. The IRS provides an illustration of this point:
Example (1). A, an individual who makes his returns on the basis of the calendar year,
on January 1, 1962, acquired and placed in service in his trade or business an item of
Section 38 property with an estimated useful life of eight years. On January 1, 1965, A
removes the item of Section 38 property from use in his trade or business by converting
such item to personal use. Therefore no deduction for depreciation with respect to such
item of property is allowable to A for the taxable year 1965. On January 1, 1965, such
item of property ceases to be Section 38 property with respect to A.
Treas. Reg. 1.47-2(a)(2)(iii), ex. 1, T.D. 6931, 1967-2 C.B. 12, as amended by T.D. 7203, 1972-2
C.B. 12. If a taxpayer, however, depreciates an asset to zero using an accepted method of depreci-
ation under § 167, and does so before the end of the asset's useful life, that asset does not cease to
be § 38 property. Treas. Reg. 1.47-2(a)(2)(iii) (1967), example 2, illustrates this point:
On January 1, 1965, A placed in service an item of Section 38 property with a basis of
$10,000 and an estimated useful life of 4 years. A depreciates such item, which has a
salvage value of $2,000 (after taking into account Section 167(F)), on the declining bal-
ance method at a rate of 50 percent (that is twice the straight line rate of 25 percent).
With respect to such item, A is allowed deductions for depreciation of $5,000 for 1965,
$2,500 for 1966, and $500 for 1967. A is not allowed a deduction for depreciation in
1968 although he continues to use such item in his trade or business. Such item does not
cease to be section 38 property with respect to A in 1968.
Id
Thus, the IRS admits, however subtly, that cost recovery and cost reduction may require differ-
ent analyses of basis. Example 2 shows that while the amount of the depreciation deduction may
be affected, the status of the asset as § 38 property need not be affected. Seeinfra notes 156-82 and
accompanying text. The issue of whether a reduction in basis for depreciation necessarily meant a
reduction in basis for purposes of the investment tax credit recapture provisions also faced the
court in Panhandle Eastern.
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The court declared, in effect, that the basis concept can serve two roles,
both of which need not be identical at all times. The court's ruling
implies that cost basis serves as a reservoir for historical cost, which is
recovered by the taxpayer using periodic depreciation deductions
which eventually drain off that reservoir. The court's decision also sug-
gests, however, that basis embodies the asset's acquisition costs, which
are used to determine investment tax credits. By permitting the tax-
payer to defer section 108 gain through a section 1017 basis reduction
without pro rata ITC recapture, the court recognized that all changes in
depreciable basis do not necessarily affect cost basis for ITC purposes.
The Panhandle court's decision underscores an important notion: a
cost recovery scheme"0 7 and a cost reduction system are unique and
distinguishable. Congress reaffirmed this view in 1980 by implying that
all changes in basis do not necessarily effect a recapture of ITC bene-
fits.' The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980t09 amends section 1017 and
declares that a reduction in basis under section 108 should not be con-
strued as a disposition." 0
A number of other cases also suggest that a taxpayer's basis for in-
vestment credit purposes should equal his outlay of funds."' If the
taxpayer fails to expend his own funds, however, he acquires a zero
107. For a discussion of the use of the cost recovery system to effect a recapture of certain
deferred taxes, see infra note 110. For a general discussion of the differences between cost recov-
ery and cost reduction, see supra notes 88-97.
108. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (codified in scattered
Sections of 26 U.S.C.)
109. Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). This legis-
lation makes § 1017(c) applicable to debt discharges occurring after Jan. 1, 1981. I.R.C. § 1017(c)
(Supp. IV 1980).
110. Section 1017(c)(2) states that a "reduction in basis under this section shall not be treated
as a disposition." I.R.C. § 1017(c) (Supp. IV 1980). The effect of this amendment is to prohibit
the IRS from imposing a recapture tax under § 47(a) in the event of a § 108/§ 1017 adjustment to
basis, as such adjustments are not to be considered dispositions. S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 20, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7017, 7035. The current position of the
IRS, in accordance with § 1017(c) as amended, is given in Rev. Rul. 81-206, 1981-2 C.B. 9.
111. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 35 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Moore McCor-
mack Resources, Inc. v. United States, 46 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 80-5075 (Ct. CI. 1980) (unreported
order); Ness v. United States, 45 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 80-784 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (unreported case);
Gilman v. United States, 45 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 80-782 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (unreported case); Schmidt
Barge Lines v. United States, 610 F.2d 728 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Oglebay Norton Co. v. United States,
610 F.2d 715 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Delta S.S. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 544 F.2d 496 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Pacific Far E. Lines v. United States, 544 F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Pacific Transp. Co. v. United
States, 544 F.2d 493 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See also Charbonnet v. United States, 455 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.
1972). But see Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981).
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basis for ITC purposes."12 In one line of cases, which can be denoted
third party payments cases, a taxpayer who uses a third party's invested
capital to acquire section 38 property does not receive the investment
credit.1 3 The ITC rewards the investor whose funds are actually at
risk, but is unavailable to third parties whose capital is not at risk."14
The tax court in Zuanich v. Commissioner"5 relied on a similar line
of cases'16 and rejected the notion that a cash outlay from a capital
construction fund for a depreciable asset is eligible for ITC benefits.
Using the third party payments cases as the Zuanich court did, how-
ever, misapprehends the nature of third party payments situations; that
is, a taxpayer who uses another's funds may not claim an investment
credit, not because he fails to demonstrate a cost basis in the property
itself, but because basis for ITC purposes is held by another.' '7 Tax-
112. See infra note 113.
113. See, e.g., Wolfers v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 975 (1978) (payments under the Uniform
Property Relocation Assistance Act not treated as investment for purposes of § 38); Anderson v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1035 (1970) (no investment on part of claimant found where taxpayer used
payments from sale of oil and gas production interests). See also Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77
T.C. 428 (1981) (Goffe, J., dissenting).
114. See supra notes 80, 83-86 and accompanying text (discussion of the at-risk rules).
115. 77 T.C. 428 (1981).
116. See supra note 113. The tax court viewed the third party payments cases as analogous to
the MMA problem. MMA beneficiaries might be said to use the cash of another, such as the cash
that would have been paid to the federal government as taxes, when they invest in eligible vessels,
This cash, however, is merely a loan to the taxpayer, which the federal government will recover
during the useful life of the vessel. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Furthermore, it
would appear that such funds are at risk when invested in eligible vessels. See supra note 80. The
third party payments cases recognize that a taxpayer whose funds are not at risk and who is
merely a conduit for the capital of another, is not eligible for ITC benefits. MMA beneficiaries,
however, invest capital which is at risk. The analogy between MMA beneficiaries and the third
party payments cases thus seems ill-conceived at best.
117. Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981) (Goffe, J., dissenting). The Revenue Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), provides further
support for the notion that cost basis is the standard Congress intended to use for investment
credit purposes. The Act changed the recapture rules in § 47, extending them to property that is
the subject of casualty, theft, or disposition. Thus a taxpayer whose § 38 property is destroyed by
fire is subject to the recapture tax of § 47(a), and is also eligible for an additional tax credit if he
reinvests his cash or his insurance payments in new § 38 property. I.R.C. § 47(a) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980 & West Supp. 1982); I.R.C. § 38 (1976). H.R. REP. No. 533, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. 28,
reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1825, 1843. This change in the law, while
relatively minor, suggests an analysis based on the rewarding of those who invest cash and, thus,
incur cost in an asset, as opposed to merely rewarding new investment in new or used property.
Under the investment credit provisions prior to the 1969 termination, there was no recapture tax
imposed on disposition of an asset via casualty, but no credit was granted upon reinvestment of
insurance money for replacement purposes either.
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payers who use cash from a capital construction fund do have a cost
basis in the vessel so acquired, and the analogy to third party payments
cases is inapposite.
Congress intended taxpayers to calculate the ITC as a percentage of
cost basis." 8 The preceding analysis demonstrates that this concept is
essential to the implementation of a cost reduction approach. The re-
sult of this conceptualization of the relationship between cost recovery
and cost reduction produces a bifurcated basis standard: one standard
for depreciation, and a second standard for the ITC."19 Usually, the
two standards will be the same. In situations similar to the MMA,
however, in which the timing of cost recovery and cost reduction is not
synchronized, 20 failure to recognize a bifurcated basis standard frus-
trates the legislative purposes expressed in the ITC.' 2' It is illogical to
argue against the bifurcated basis standard simply because Congress
failed to explicitly state one when it created the MMA's special depreci-
ation scheme. Congress had no reason to explore the basis issues raised
by the MMA because the MMA was enacted more than a year before
the investment tax credit was reenacted. 122 Congress did, however,
Given this additional support for the cost basis concept, and given further the lack of any cost
basis on the hands of the taxpayers in Wolfers and Anderson, see supra note 113, it should be
apparent that it is the lack of a cost basis in an asset that will force a taxpayer to fail in a claim for
the investment credit.
118. See supra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.
119. In other words, an adjusted basis standard under § 1016 is used to facilitate a cost recov-
ery program, while a cost basis standard is used to effect the intent of Congress inherent in a cost
reduction program. I.R.C. § 1016 (1976 & West Supp. 1982).
120. Cost is recovered prior to the purchase of the vessel, when deposits are made to a capital
construction fund. Cost is reduced by the investment credit, however, at the end of the year of
acquisition. See supra note 27.
121. See supra notes 76-97.
122. See supra note 53. Congress did enact a bifurcated basis provision in § 48(4) with respect
to investment credits for movie and television films. One might argue that having consciously
chosen a bifurcated basis standard in § 48(4), Congress would have enacted a similar standard for
the MMA if it had so desired. See Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981). I.R.C. § 48(4)
(1976) was designed, however, to split the basis standard depending on the locus of production
costs; that is, § 48(4) creates a bifurcated basis standard not to effect some special cost recovery
scheme, but rather to provide an incentive for additional film production in the United States:
[Tihe amount of the investment credit in the case of movie films is to depend on the
place of production of the film (i.e., United States or foreign), rather than on the place
where the revenues are [earned]. Thus, the foreign use test [§ 48(a)(2)] will not apply to
movie films for the future.
H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 188-89, reprintedin 1976 U.S. COE CONo. & AD. NEWS
2897, 3083. This splitting of the basis standard with respect to movie and television films was also
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make its intent quite clear with respect to the ITC.12 3 To effect the
intent of Congress one must color the words of the statute with the
policies declared by the legislature. Words and phrases taken summa-
rily from the Code cannot substitute for the judicious application of
legislative intent. 124 A bifurcated basis standard is essential to the
proper application of the MMA provisions and the policies expressed
in the ITC.
V. DEPRECIATION: ALLOWED VS. ALLOWABLE IN SECTION 48(a)
A. The Depreciation Concept
In general, depreciation represents the allocation of the cost of an
asset to each period of an asset's life. 2 ' Courts have embraced two
theories in deciding depreciation disputes. One, the tax free fund con-
cept, 126 suggests that a taxpayer should be able to recover the cost of
done in order to deal with the foreign use obstacle in § 48(a)(2) to producers claiming the invest-
ment credit. I.R.C. § 48(a)(2) (1976). This act of Congress, however, is not analogous to the
proposed bifurcated basis standard for vessel owners covered by the Merchant Marine Act. The
latter requires a bifurcated standard in order to harmonize the special cost recovery system with
the legislative intent of the investment credit. The movie and television provision splits the basis
standard for completely different reasons, and produces a rather different outcome. The Zuanich
court erroneously concluded that since Congress chose to enact a bifurcated basis standard in
§ 48, the lack of such an explicit enactment in the ITC must conclusively demonstrate that the
standard is not appropriate for judicial injection into the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 48
(1976). But Congress enacted this standard in § 48 to solve a problem relating to ITC eligibility
and foreign made goods. Id The MMA, however, requires some bifurcation of the basis concept
in order to harmonize the goals of the Merchant Marine Act, a statute outside the Internal Reve-
nue Code, with the ITC.
123. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
124. Helvering v. Stockholm Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1934) (dicta). The Tax
Court, in Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981), argued that Congress failed to make its
intent clear. The court observed that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, the Code
must be read literally. Of course if read literally, one would reduce basis by the amount of depre-
ciation taken. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. A taxpayer using a capital construction
fund under the MMA would thus be unable to claim an ITC to the full extent of capital construc-
tion fund money used to acquire an eligible vessel. See supra note 37.
125. "[T]he depreciation charge is not a measurement of value changes; it is an allocation of the
cost of the asset." D. KiEso & J. WEYGANDT, supra note 58, at 520 (emphasis in original). It is
the estimation and allocation of the cost of a capital investment to each of the succeeding periods
of an asset's life in order to match costs with earnings. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 528 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
126. Massey Motors v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960); Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner,
319 U.S. 98 (1943); United States v. Lundey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927); City of Knoxville v. Knoxville
Water Co., 212 US. 1 (1907); Reisinger v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1944). See 1975
Wis. L. REv. 230, 234-35.
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the asset periodically as consumption and further usage effect a decline
in value. The other theory, the matching approach, 27 received official
sanction by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co. 128
The matching theory suggests that depreciation is merely a matching of
the expenses of asset acquisition with the income produced by that
asset.129
Accelerated depreciation systems represent attempts by the govern-
ment to permit taxpayers to match the real cost of an asset against the
revenues produced by that asset.'30 Accelerated depreciation thus im-
plies a frank recognition of the inherent weakness of an historical cost
system during a period of prolonged and intense inflation.' 3 ' Acceler-
ated depreciation, however, is still consistent with the matching ap-
proach laid out by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Idaho
Power, 32 because it represents an attempt to match the true cost of an
asset against current revenues without entering the quagmire of infla-
tion-adjusted accounting. 33
The MMA permits a system of tax deferral which effectively acceler-
ates the benefits of depreciation deductions to periods prior to asset
acquisition. This results in a deferral of the tax burden to the years of
actual use of the vessel. 134 More conventional accelerated depreciation
systems have virtually the same impact in that they create greater tax
deductions in early years while deferring a portion of tax liability to
127. The matching principle expresses the concept that "asset expirations, or expenses, directly
associated with particular types of revenue are recognized as expenses in the period in which the
revenues are recognized." S. DAVIDSON, C. STICKNEY, & R. WEIL, supra note 91, at 76.
128. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
129. See supra notes 127-28.
130. Section 167 permits the taxpayer to use, among other methods, the sum of the year's
digits and the double-declining balance systems. I.R.C. § 167 (1976 & West Supp. 1982). Both
are accelerated depreciation methods. Section 168 creates a new class life system, which is also an
accelerated depreciation system. I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1982). See Kahn, Accelerated Depreci.
at/on-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance For Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV, 1
(1979). See also Disclosure of Certain Replacement Cost Data-SEC Accounting Series Release
No. 190, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17 (1976); 3 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDs-AccOuNTINO, Fnan-
cialReporting and Changing Prices § 1072 (1981). Seegenerally E. BRIGHAM & J. PAPPAS, LBER-
ALIZED DEPRECIATION AND THE COST OF CAPITAL (1970); G. TERBOROH, UNDERDEPRECIATION
FROM INFLATION, A GHOST RETURNS (1969).
131. Seesupra note 130 (statements by the Securities Exchange Commission and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board).
132. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
133. See D. KiEso & J. WEYGANDT, supra note 57, at 1116-58.
134. See supra note 27.
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later years of the asset's life. 3 ' The basis concepts in cost recovery,
however, should not be confused with those inherent in cost reduc-
tion. 36  Basis is adjusted for cost recovery purposes, just as in the
MMA, 137 in order to ensure that depreciation deductions are not taken
on elements of cost which have already been recovered. 38 Further-
more, adjustments made to basis which are designed to ensure that ele-
ments of cost are deducted only once are irrelevant to the purpose of
the investment credit; namely, to reduce the initial cost.' 39 Basis is ad-
justed to prevent double depreciation deductions and to
facilitate the calculation of depreciation recapture.' 40  These adjust-
ments relate to cost recovery not cost reduction; thus, their effects
should be confined accordingly.
B. Basis Recovery Through a Method of Depreciation -
Treasury Regulation 1.48-1(b)141 provides tests for determining
whether property is depreciable. It requires that the taxpayer recover
135. This concept can be illustrated using a simple, if somewhat unrealistic, example. Assume
Roe Corporation earns, and will continue to earn gross revenues of $1 million per year for the
next 20 years, and that it has no deductions except for depreciation. Assume further that on
January 1 of years one and six Roe buys a $500,000 asset, and the corporation uses the straight
line method in years one through five, but then decides to use the 200% double-declining balance
(DDB) method of depreciation under I.R.C. § 167 (1976 & West Supp. 1982) in years six through
ten. Assume also a five-year useful life, no salvage value, a 10% discount rate, and a switch to
straight line in year four of the second asset's life to depreciate the remaining adjusted basis to
zero. Finally, assume taxes are paid and revenue is earned on the last day of each year. Upon
comparing Figure A with Figure B, it is apparent that the 200% DDB method defers some tax
hability from years six and seven to the last years of the asset's useful life. Figure C shows that if
one ignores the time value of money, all of the deferred taxes are recaptured. Of course, money
has a time value, and Figure D indicates that an accelerated depreciation system gives the tax-
payer an added benefit never recovered by the government. The conventional accelerated depre-
ciation system noted here resembles the more unusual depreciation system outlined supra note 26.
In each case, the timing of the deductions yielded a subsidy to the taxpayer in the form of the time
value of the deferred taxes.
136. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
137. 46 U.S.C. § 1177(g) (1976). See supra note 26.
138. Pacific Far E. Lines v. United States, 544 F.2d 478, 488 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
139. Id
140. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-I (1956), as amended by Treas. Reg. 1.167(b)-2, T.D. 6712,
1964-1 C.B. 106 (basis reduction for salvage value to prevent double depreciation deductions);
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(8)(C)(1956) (basis calculation for depreciation recapture).
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(b) (1964) states in relevant part:
(1) Property is not section 38 property unless a deduction for depreciation (or amortiza-
tion in lieu of depreciation) with respect to such property is allowable to the taxpayer for
the taxable year. A deduction for depreciation is allowable if the property is of a charac-
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the basis, or cost, of the property through a method of depreciation,
and that the depreciation deduction be "allowable," that is, property
"of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation under section
167. ''t42 The de minimis standards for determining whether property is
depreciable are part of those standards used for determining ITC eligi-
bility. Under the Code, only depreciable property may receive the
ITC.143 Section 167 indicates that property, having a useful life of three
years or more, which is used in a trade or business, may be depreciated
using an accelerated method.'" A vessel must be used in merchant
activity in foreign or domestic commerce in order for the shipowner to
use a capital construction fund.145 Obviously, such vessels have a useful
life in excess of three years. Thus, those who use capital construction
funds satisfy the de minimis standards for ITC eligibility.
Beyond these de minimis standards, the threshold question is
whether a fleet owner, electing under the MMA to acquire a new or
reconstructed vessel using only capital construction fund money, ever
recovers the cost of the vessel through "a method of depreciation."146
When a vessel owner takes current deductions for deposits to the capi-
tal construction fund, the owner is in effect taking depreciation deduc-
tions in advance of the acquisition of the asset. This constitutes
nothing more than a rather unusual form of accelerated depreciation,
through which the federal government grants a subsidy equal to the
ter subject to the allowance for depreciation under section 167 and the basis (or cost) of
the property is recovered through a method of depreciation...
Id
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-(I)(b) amplifies the flush language immediately following § 48(a)(1)
which states, in relevant part, that § 38 property "includes only recovery property (within the
meaning of § 168 without regard to any useful life) and any other property with respect to which
depreciation (or amortization in lieu of depreciation) is allowable. . . ." Id
143. Section 48 indicates the minimum three year life standard in the flush language following
§ 48(a)(1). See I.R.C. § 48 (West Supp. 1982). The property must be tangible personalty accord-
ing to the first sentence of § 48(a). Id Finally, the property must be depreciable. See supra note
128. To be depreciable, property must be used in a trade, or business, or held for the production
of income. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (1976 & West Supp. 1982).
144. I.R.C. § 167(a)(1), -(2) & (c) (1976 & West Supp. 1982). To use the ACRS, § 168(c)
requires that the property being depreciated must be "tangible property of a character subject to
the allowance for depreciation [which is] used in a trader or business, or held for the production of
income." Id. § 168(c)(1) (West Supp. 1982). By implication, § 168(c)(2) suggests that recovery
property must have a useful life in excess of three years. Id. § 168(c)(2). Thus, the requirements
under § 168 closely resemble those under § 167.
145. See supra note 19.
146. See supra note 141.
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time value of the deferred taxes to the fleet owner.147 The taxpayer
receives large tax deductions during the early part of the useful life of
the asset, but by the end of the useful life the government recovers the
taxes so deferred.1 41 With the exception of a timing difference, this
does not differ from conventional accelerated depreciation; the MMA
simply allows the taxpayer to take the deduction prematurely, as op-
posed to sometime during the life of the asset. Because the deduction
approach under the MMA is closely analogous to more conventional
accelerated depreciation, it would appear that the taxpayer recovers
cost through "a method of depreciation." Therefore, insofar as the first
part of the test 149 is concerned, vessels covered by the MMA should be
eligible for the ITC.5 °
The IRS might argue that this line of analysis destroys the distinction
between accelerated depreciation and current expensing. Current ex-
pensing is the recognition, for tax accounting purposes, of an expendi-
ture in the same tax period in which the expense is incurred. The IRS
has nothing to fear on this score, however, because the concepts
presented above do not open the ITC to all taxpayers owning nomi-
nally eligible' 51 assets. If the cost of any asset is expensed entirely in
one period," 2 then the property can never be eligible for the invest-
ment credit because ITC eligibility requires that cost be recovered by
some method of depreciation. 153 A taxpayer who has a cost basis in the
asset, but fails to use a recognized method of cost recovery, cannot
qualify under section 38. Therefore, acceptance of the accelerated de-
predation analogy, as applied to the MMA, need not force the IRS to
treat all assets having a positive cost basis as eligible for the ITC. That
is, not all assets having a cost basis for ITC purposes and a zero basis
for depreciation purposes should be treated as qualifying for the invest-
147. See supra notes 27 & 135.
148. See supra note 135.
149. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
150. But see infra notes 171-90 and accompanying text (analyzing the "amount allowable"
requirement for ITC eligibility).
151. Nominally eligible assets might be described as those meeting the de minimis standards
for ITC eligibility. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 528 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Wagenson
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653 (1980).
153. Current expensing is not a method of depreciation. See I.R.C. § 167 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980); I.R.C. § 168 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); supra note 136. See also Treas. Reg. 1.48-(b)(3)
(1964).
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ment credit. Only those assets whose cost is recovered by some method
of depreciation should be considered eligible for the ITC. 54 Vessel
owners using capital construction funds to acquire new ships employ a
special cost recovery system analogous to accelerated depreciation.
This differs from mere current expensing, and the IRS need not view
the above analysis as a threat to its general asset eligibility standards
under section 48.155
At one time, several exceptions applied to the general rule that tax-
payers using accelerated depreciation are ITC-eligible. 156 These excep-
tion sections granted certain taxpayers an election between either five-
year amortization or the investment tax credit in tandem with any sec-
tion 167 depreciation method. 157 Congress first enacted the five-year
amortization provisions for selected taxpayers in order to provide some
tax expenditure substitute following the repeal of the ITC in 1970.158
The Tax Court, in a recent decision, declared that the existence of these
154. See supra note 142.
155. See supra notes 141-42.
156. I.R.C. § 48(a)(8) (1970 & Supp. II) rendered the 60-month amortization provisions ITC-
ineligible by placing them outside the § 38 definition of property. Congress originally intended
these provisions--§§ 167(k), 169, 184, 187 & 188--to serve as a replacement for the investment
credit. See infra note 158. These sections were exceptions to the general rule that taxpayers using
accelerated depreciation under § 167, and now § 168 as well, could also claim the ITC. Each of
these 60-month amortization provisions has since been repealed, scheduled for termination, or
had its ITC ineligibility removed. See I.R.C. § 167(k) (1976 & West Supp. 1982) (rehabilitation
expenditures for low income housing---section inapplicable to property placed in service after 1
Jan. 1984); I.R.C. § 188 (1977 & Supp. IV 1980) (child care facilities-section inapplicable to
property placed in service after Jan. 1, 1982); I.R.C. § 184(e)(1) (1976) (railroad rolling stock-
section applicable to property placed in service between 1969 and 1976); I.R.C. § 169 (1976) (pol-
lution control equipment-ITC-ineligibility removed, see I.R.C. § 169(h) (1976)); I.R.C. § 187
(1970) (coal mine safety equipment-section repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1905
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)).
Only one 60-month amortization provision was not intended as a substitute for the ITC. See
IR.C, § 191 (1976) (historic structure rehabilitation). This section was the only exception to the
general rule which was not enacted as a substitute for the ITC and it has since been repealed.
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34 (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.). Upon repealing § 191, congressional policy became consistent: those using any method
of accelerated depreciation could claim the ITC as well.
157. Property that qualified under § 167(a) for depreciation will also generally qualify for
accelerated cost recovery under § 168. See I.R.C. § 167 (1976 & West Supp. 1982); I.R.C. § 168
(West Supp. 1982).
158. S. REP. No. 437, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 33, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1918, 1940. H.R. REP. No. 533, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1836. Following the repeal of the investment credit in 1969, Congress created
the 60-month amortization provisions to replace the investment credit in certain selected invest-
ment activities. When Congress reenacted the investment tax credit in 1971, see supra note 51, it
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exceptions indicates an historically inconsistent policy with respect to
those using accelerated depreciation and those claiming the ITC.5 9
This alleged lack of consistency could be important. If a taxpayer
indicates that he uses a form of accelerated depreciation, but the IRS
can show that use of a form of accelerated. depreciation does not uni-
formlyr satisfy Regulation 1.48-(1)(b), 161 a court could' 6' deny ITC eli-
gibility. The Tax Court did just this in Zuanich v. Commissioner.t62 In
effect, the Tax Court concluded that use of a form of accelerated depre-
ciation does not per se qualify a taxpayer for the ITC. The MMA, of
course, provides for a form of accelerated depreciation. The Tax Court
has compared the MMA to the sixty-month amortization provisions to
show that there is no consistent congressional policy toward those who
use accelerated depreciation and claim the ITC.163 Generally, a tax-
payer must carry the burden of proof in claiming a tax credit or deduc-
tion. 1' 4 Because there appears to be no consistent policy toward those
using accelerated depreciation forms and claiming the ITC, 165 a court
could argue that use of a form of accelerated depreciation does not, in
itself, qualify a taxpayer for ITC benefits.
declared that, in view of the reasons for the creation of the special 60-month amortization, it
would be inconsistent to permit the use of both five year amortization and the investment tax
credit. Consequently, Congress mandated that taxpayers choose between either five-year amorti-
zation or the investment tax credit in combination with a § 167 depreciation method. See gener-
ally 71-26 TAX MGMT. MEM. 3, 9 (1971).
159. Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428, 441-43 (1981). The Tax Court suggested that the
availability of an election between either five-year amortization or accelerated depreciation, plus
the investment credit, indicates a lack of consistent willingness to grant the investment credit to
those using accelerated depreciation. This reasoning implies that an analogy between accelerated
depreciation and the Merchant Marine Act's depreciation system is worthless and that the lack of
a consistent policy makes the analogy inconsequential. This characterization is unfair as well as
misleading. See supra notes 156-5 8 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 141.
161. Of course, such a decision would be inconsistent with the legislative history of the ITC.
See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text. The Tax Court justified its decision in Zuanich v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981), by attempting to show that the legislative history did not
clearly demonstrate congressional intent. The Tax Court erred, however, in its interpretation of
the legislative history. See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
162. 77 T.C. 428 (1981).
163. Id at 438, 442.
164. E.g., Landerman v. Commissioner, 454 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1971); Kirk v. Commissioner,
425 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Mayrath v. Commissioner, 357 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1966); Standard
Oil Co. (NJ.) v. United States, 338 F.2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1964); Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d
573 (4th Cir. 1961); Weir v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1960).
165. But see notes 164-70 and accompanying text (indicating that a congressional policy can
be discerned, and that the five-year amortization provisions can be distinguished).
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The MMA, however, differs from the five-year amortization provi-
sions because Congress did not design the MMA's cost recovery
scheme to replace investment credit benefits, while it designed the
sixty-month amortization rules for exactly that purpose.1 66 To argue
that the MMA's cost recovery system is analogous to the five-year
amortization provision, however, is to treat the intent of these two
pieces of legislation identically. Congress designed the five-year amor-
tization provisions as substitutes for the ITC. Thus, these provisions
were to be outside the regular section 167 depreciation schemes. Con-
gress did not intend the MMA, however, to replace ITC benefits. 67
Denying the full ITC to beneficiaries of the MMA on the basis of an
analogy to the amortization provisions implies that the purposes of the
two sets of provisions were the same. The legislative histories clearly
indicate otherwise.' Furthermore, in all instances Congress has either
phased out the five-year amortization provisions or has lifted their ITC
ineligibility. 6 9 Congressional policy towards the relationship between
ITC eligibility and the use of accelerated depreciation forms is there-
fore not inconsistent. Thus, the use of a form of accelerated deprecia-
tion, such as the MMA's capital construction fund system, should
satisfy the ITC eligibility rules. 7 '
C. Alowed" vs. "Allowable" in Section 48(a)
Only depreciable property is eligible for the investment tax credit.' 7 1
Section 48(a)(1), in the flush language following subpart (G), adds that
section 38 property "includes only recovery property ...and any
other property with respect to which depreciation is allowable."'' 72
Clearly, eligible property consists of property that is subject to the ac-
celerated cost recovery system, or property against which depreciation
is "allowable." Thus, the question becomes whether an asset is depre-
ciable, such that depreciation is allowable, without concurrently having
166. See supra note 158. I.R.C. § 191 (1976) was not intended as a substitute for the invest-
ment credit. It has since been repealed. See supra note 156.
167. See supra notes 16-25 & 41-56 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 158.
169. See supra note 156.
170. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
171. I.R.C. § 48(a) (West Supp. 1982) (flush language). See supra notes 141-42 and accompa-
nying text,
172. See supra note 142.
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some amount greater than zero "allowed" as a depreciation deduc-
tion. 173 A close examination of Regulation 1.48-1(b) indicates that the
IRS envisions at least one situation in which it is possible to hold de-
preciable property, which fulfills the allowable requirement, without
such property being eligible for any depreciation deduction-an
amount "allowed."' 174 For example, if a taxpayer uses property which
is to be depreciated only in periods subsequent to the current tax year,
such property is still considered depreciable during that tax period even
though the taxpayer does not claim a deduction. 75 Therefore, the gen-
eral presumption that depreciation is allowable only when there is an
amount allowed need not be considered universal.
A taxpayer taking advantage of the MMA tax deferral scheme is in
an analogous position, for there might be a zero basis for depreciation
purposes 176 on property which is depreciable in nature. The IRS has
argued 177 that the use of capital construction fund money decreases 78
the depreciable basis of property dollar for dollar. It maintains that, to
the extent of the decrease in basis, the property is not depreciable and is
173. See supra note 141. Having demonstrated that the Merchant Marine Act system is simply
a special form of depreciation, see supra notes 124-68 and accompanying text, it is necessary to
establish that a deduction is "allowable" in order to meet the eligibility test laid out in I.R.C.
§ 48(a) (West Supp. 1982) and in Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(b)(1) (1964). See Pacific Far E. Lines v.
United States, 544 F.2d 478, 486-87 (Ct. Cl. 1976); supra note 127. See also 10 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAt'L L. 341 (1977).
174. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(b)(1) (1964) suggests, for example, that:
"If property is placed in service. . . but under the taxpayer's depreciation practice the
period for depreciation with respect to such property begins in a taxable year subsequent
to the taxable year in which such property is placed in service, then a deduction for
depreciation shall be treated as allowable. .
Id. See infra note 181.
175. See supra note 174.
176. A zero basis for depreciation purposes could occur where a taxpayer uses the balance of
his capital construction fund to finance the total cost of a new vessel. If all of the cash came from
the ordinary income account of the capital construction fund, see supra note 20; 46 U.S.C.
§ 1177(g)(2) (1976), basis would be reduced dollar for dollar to zero.
177. Rev. Rul. 68-468, 1968-2 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 67-359, 1967-2 C.B. 11.
178. The IRS does not explicitly distinguish between cost recovery and cost reduction. Conse-
quently, it reads the basis reduction provisions of the Merchant Marine Act as applicable to in-
vestment credit determinations. The Court of Claims rejects this argument, See Moore
McCormack Resources, Inc. v. United States, 46 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 80-5075 (Ct. Cl. 19890); Ness
v. United States, 45 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 80-784 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Gilman v. United States, 45 A.F.T.R.
2d 80-782 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Schmidt Barge Lines v. United States, 610 F.2d 728 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
Ogebay Norton Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 715 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Delta S.S. Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 544 F.2d 496 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Pacific Far E. Lines v. United States, 544 F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl.
1976); Pacific Transp. Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 493 (Ct. Cf. 1976). The Tax Court agrees
with the position taken by the IRS. Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981).
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thus ineligible for the ITC.'79 The MMA system, however, is merely a
tax deferral concept akin to accelerated depreciation. Thus, a denial of
the ITC constitutes an inconsistent treatment of vessel owners who are
lawfully using the MMA provisions.' The Regulations' 8 t envision
situations in which, as a result of accelerated depreciation methods,
property might be considered depreciable while no deduction is cur-
rently allowed. For example, when a taxpayer has depreciated an asset
to zero before its useful life is over, the IRS still considers the property
depreciable, and no recapture of the ITC occurs merely because the
taxpayer can take no further deductions, or amounts allowed. 18 2 Be-
cause the MMA merely provides for a form of accelerated deprecia-
tion,183 quod erat demonstrandum 84 the IRS should consider the
vessels depreciable to the full extent of their cost basis.
It seems illogical to contend that depreciable property can somehow
be converted into nondepreciable property as the result of an adjust-
ment to basis resulting from cost recovery concerns.18 5 Congress man-
dated basis reduction concurrently with qualified withdrawals from a
capital construction fund in order to complete the tax deferral sys-
tem. "'86 Although the basis reductions certainly affect the amount al-
lowed as a depreciation deduction, they should not affect the amount
allowable, for Congress declared in the Revenue Act of 1962 that the
ITC's aim is cost reduction.'87 Therefore, cost basis or cash outlay
must be the sum upon which the tax credit is calculated. 188 Because
adjustments to basis under the MMA are made to prevent more than
one deduction for cost recovery, 89 such adjustments should not effect
179. See supra notes 177-78. I.R.C. § 46(g) (1976) somewhat modifies the amounts in ques-
tion, but not the arguments themselves. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
180. Compare supra note 27 with supra note 135.
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.47-2(a)(ii) states in relevant part that:
Section 38 property does not cease to be section 38 property with respect to the taxpayer
in any taxable year subsequent to the credit year merely because under the taxpayer's
depreciation practice no deduction for depreciation with respect to such property is al-
lowable to the taxpayer for the taxable year provided that the property continues to be
used [in business] and otherwise qualifies as section 38 property ...
Id See supra noie 106. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.47-2(a)(2)(iii) (1967) (examples 1 & 2).
182. See supra note 181.
183. See supra note 27.
184. Literally, "therefore it has been shown."
185. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 41-47.
188. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
189. 46 U.S.C. 1177(g) (1976). See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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the amount of investment credit granted because the purposes of basis
for depreciation, and for the ITC, differ.190
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress intended that the investment credit be used to spur new
investment in plant and equipment by reducing the acquisition cost of
depreciable assets.' 9 ' Congress designed the depreciation requirement
to ensure that the type of property taxpayers purchased would meet the
fiscal policy goals of the ITC.' 92 Because cost reduction was the goal of
the investment tax credit, basis for depreciation should be distinguished
from cost basis for ITC purposes.' 93
The MMA provides for a system of deductions that is analogous to
accelerated depreciation. Even if a vessel has a zero basis for deprecia-
tion purposes' 94 upon the date of purchase, the property is still depre-
ciable. Although no amount is allowed as a further deduction,
depreciation is still allowable within the meaning of the Code. 95 Prop-
erty does not cease to be depreciable merely because the depreciation
convention used by the taxpayer reduces basis to zero before the end of
the asset's useful life.' 96 Thus, when a taxpayer acquires an asset using
tax deferred funds accumulated under the MMA provisions, an invest-
ment credit calculated upon the full cost basis in the asset should be
granted. To do otherwise is to frustrate the intent of Congress with
respect to the ITC, as well as to confuse a cost recovery scheme with a
cost reduction system. 197 The investment tax credit should be liberally
construed in keeping with its stated purposes.' 9 Taxpayers who build
or reconstruct vessels using tax deferred funds under the MMA per-
190. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
192. Congress wished to encourage investment in plant and equipment to increase the produc-
tivity of American industry. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. To ensure that the
credit was granted only for investments that would accomplish this purpose, Congress created the
de minimis standards for investment credit eligibility. See Supra notes 142-43,
193. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 171-90 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
198. Minot Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 435 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1970); Cameron
Iron Works v. United States, 621 F.2d 406 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. United States,
513 F.2d 1342 (Ct. CL. 1975); Alabama Displays, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1974);
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form the investment function Congress designed the ITC to reward. 99
Statutes constitute nothing more than codified expressions of the intent
of Congress and must be read in a manner designed to effectuate that
intent.2°°
Joshua P. Agrons
Northville Dock Corp. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 68 (1969). See also King Radio Corp. v. United
States, 486 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1973); Weirick v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 446 (1974).
199. See supra notes 41-42.
200. See Helvering v. Stockholm Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84 (1934); Sacramento Navigation
Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326 (1926); United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233 (1909); United States v.
Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867). See generally 2A C. SANDS, supra note 72 at ch. 45,
§§ 45.01-15.
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